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INTRODUCTION
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 ("FQPA")1 represents
a crossroads in both science and law. On the legal side, the FQPA
represents a fundamental shift in how we legislate risk regulation.
The FQPA takes a step away from bright-line rules strictly delineating
standards for risk regulation toward more flexible approaches that
acknowledge the need to assess, and where appropriate, implement
changing science and technology. On the scientific side, the FQPA
represents a basic shift in the end goals of science. In the past,
science has sought to discover and understand. Now, the FQPA calls
on science to go beyond this traditional goal and synthesize informa-
tion to allow for the quantification of risks.
The existence of these simultaneous crossroads presents a unique
and challenging situation for the regulatory process, which is assigned
the task of implementing the fundamental shifts in both science and
law. This is a monumental challenge for a regulatory state that is
already receiving harsh criticism for its current shortcomings. This
article defines the crossroads in science and law and then discusses
how the regulatory process might successfully handle the new
challenges it faces.
* Student, Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected in 1999; Nicholas School of the
Environment at Duke University, M.E.M. (Master of Environmental Management, concentration
in Environmental Toxicology) expected in 1999; B.S. 1994, Cornell University.
** CASARETr & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS i (Curtis D.
Klaassen et al. eds., 5th ed. 1996).
1. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
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The first part of this article will explore the crossroads in law
created by the restructuring of the Delaney Clause in the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996. The Delaney Clause, found in the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"), places a simple,
strict ban on carcinogenic food additives. First, the history of the
Delaney Clause and its relation to regulation of pesticide residues in
our food supply will be discussed. Second, the problems and
criticisms that have arisen over the Delaney Clause will be highlight-
ed. Third, the changes in the FFDCA brought about by the FQPA's
fundamental shift to a more flexible legislative approach to risk
regulation will be delineated with special emphasis on restructuring of
the Delaney Clause. Finally, the case of a regulated pesticide, the
fungicide benomyl, will be discussed to demonstrate how the FQPA
will affect pesticide regulation.
The second part of this article will discuss the crossroads in
science by using chemical carcinogenesis and cancer risk assessment,
both at the heart of Delaney Clause regulation, as illustrative
examples. First, the crossroads in science is defined as a fundamental
expansion of the traditional goals of discovery and understanding to
include the more synthetic goals of processing information to produce
quantified risk estimates. Second, the pathology of chemical
carcinogenesis will be outlined with an emphasis on its complex and
dynamic nature. Third, cancer risk assessment will be discussed to
illustrate how science is facing the expansion of its traditional goals.
The current and future trends in cancer risk assessment will be
highlighted to demonstrate science's movement toward more flexible
approaches, a shift that is not unlike the shift occurring in law.
Finally, an analogy will be drawn between chemical carcinogenesis
and developmental toxicity to show that similar changes are occurring
in many areas of regulatory toxicology.
The third part of this article explores the challenges for the
regulatory state that result from the crossroads in science and law.
The FQPA places a wealth of new and dynamic information at the
door of the regulatory process and depends on the regulatory process
to effectively handle this burden. Successful regulation will depend
on effective regulatory analysis and better risk communication to aid
the analysis. Effective analysis will be discussed with emphasis on
what traits the regulatory process will need to accomplish this goal.
Then, the problem of communicating to the public those decisions
made at the analysis stage will be briefly explored. Suggestions for
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improving the -communication stage will be presented, with a focus
on developing trust and credibility in the regulatory process.
Finally, the importance of recognition by the regulatory process
of the crossroads in science and law will be emphasized. The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has a critical role in this
recognition stage. Successfully acknowledging its position and
accommodating its new role will be imperative in establishing and
maintaining a successful EPA and regulatory process.
I. THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT OF 1996:
LAW AT A CROSSROADS.
During the 1950's, New York Representative James J. Delaney
chaired a House Select Committee to investigate the use of chemicals
in food products.2 Convinced that too many chemicals were being
introduced into the nation's food supply, Delaney voiced his opinion
in response to the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA")
approval of a known carcinogen, the pesticide Aramite, for use as a
food additive:
The part that chemical additives play in the cancer
picture may not yet be completely understood, but
enough is known to put us on our guard. The safety of
the public health demands that chemical additives should
be specifically pretested for carcinogenicity, and this
should be spelled out in the law. The precedent estab-
lished by the Aramite decision has opened the door,
even if only a little, to the use of carcinogens in our
foods. That door should be slammed shut and locked.
That is the purpose of my anticarcinogen provision.
3
Witnesses who testified before Congress during the 1950's stressed
that current scientific techniques could not determine a safe level for
carcinogens and, therefore, all carcinogens should be banned from the
2. Donna U. Vogt, The Delaney Clause Effects on Pesticide Policy (last modified July 13,
1995) <http://wvwvw.cnie.orgtrle/pest-l.html>.
3. Food Additives: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 171 (1958), reprinted in Les v. Reilly, 968
F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1992).
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food supply.4 Congressional concern culminated in the incorporation
of the "Delaney Clause" into the Food Additives Amendment of
1958. The Delaney Clause is codified in sections 409(c)(3)(A),
706(b)(5)(B), and 512(d)(1)(H) of the FFDCA. Section 409 states
"no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to induce cancer
when ingested by man or animal, or if it is found, after tests which are
appropriate for the evaluation of the safety of food additives, to
induce cancer in man or animal. .. ," Enactment of the Delaney
Clause in section 409 of the FFDCA established a zero-risk policy for
carcinogenic food additives. Courts in subsequent years repeatedly
interpreted the clause to be an absolute bar to all such additives
regardless of the actual risk involved.
The Delaney Clause represents a relic of the scientific past. At
the time of Congressman Delaney, science lacked the tools to
properly cope with problems such as cancer, making strict, bright-line
legislation such as the Delaney Clause necessary. As our knowledge
of cancer has evolved, it has become apparent that adherence to a
zero-risk standard is impractical, if not impossible. Technological
achievement has eroded the foundations of legislation such as the
Delaney Clause, creating widespread criticism and need for reform of
such laws.
On August 3, 1996, President Clinton signed the FQPA, ushering
in a new era for agricultural and food industries. The FQPA greatly
modifies existing portions of the FFDCA and signifies an important
step away from the Delaney Clause's strict ban on using carcinogenic
substances as food additives. The FQPA does not eliminate the
Delaney Clause, but does markedly limit its jurisdictional scope.
A. The Delaney Clause and Pesticides
One of the original purposes of the Delaney Clause was to
protect our food supply from unwanted pesticide contamination.
Congress divided this burden between two Acts to be administered by
several different agencies. Registration for the production and use of
4. See Order Responding to Objections to EPA's Response, 56 Fed. Reg. 7750, 7769
(1991), reprinted in Les, 968 F.2d at 989.
5. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1958 § 409,21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
6. See Les, 968 F.2d at 989-90; Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
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pesticides7 is regulated by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"). Pesticide residues in our food supply
are regulated by the FFDCA. EPA is responsible for setting
tolerances (the maximum allowable safe levels of a substance in or on
a food) for pesticide residues; the FDA and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture ("USDA") are responsible for enforcing the tolerances.8
Three sections of the FFDCA guide the regulation of pesticide
residues in our food. Section 402 defines foods that are adulterated,
or unusable, and consequently banned from consumer markets.'
Section 408 guides the determination of unsafe pesticide residues on
raw foods, while section 409 applies to unsafe food additives. These
sections provide the framework for setting tolerances to delineate safe
levels of substances in or on foods. Exemptions from tolerances may
be granted when the tolerance is "not necessary to protect the public
7. FIFRA defines a pesticide as "(1) any substance -or mixture of substances intended for
preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, ,(2). any substance or mixture of
substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and (3) any nitrogen
stabilizer ...." 7 U.S.C.A. § 136(u) (West 1997). Notable in this definition is the addition of
"nitrogen stabilizer" which the Food Quality Protection Act defines as "any substance or
mixture of substances intended for preventing or hindering the process of nitrification,
denitrification, ammonia volatilization, or urease production through action upon soil bacteria."
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 § 105(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489, 1491.
8. Vogt, supra note 2, at 2.
9. FFDCA § 402 states:
A food shall be deemed to be adulterated...
(a) ...
(2) ... (B) if it is a raw agricultural commodity and it bears or contains a pesticide
chemical which is unsafe within the meaning of section 346a(a) of this title, or (C) if it
is, or it nears or contains, any food additive which is unsafe within the meaning of
section 348 of this title: Provided, That where a pesticide chemical has been used in or
on a raw agricultural commodity in conformity with an exemption granted or a
tolerance prescribed under section 346a of this title and such raw agricultural com-
modity has been subjected to processing such as canning, cooking, freezing, dehydrating,
or milling, the residue of such -pesticide chemical remaining in or on such processed
food shall, notwithstanding the provisions of sections 346 and 348 of this title, not be
deemed unsafe if such residue in or on the raw agricultural commodity has been
removed to the extent possible in good manufacturing practice and the concentration
of such residue in the processed food when ready to eat is not greater than the
tolerance prescribed for the raw agricultural commodity ....
21 U.S.C. § 342 (1994).
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health."'" If an exemption is not granted, and the food fails to meet
tolerance requirements, it is deemed adulterated under section 402.
Problems arise because the FFDCA classifies pesticide residues
on raw and processed foods differently. Under section 402(a)(2), if a
pesticide residue. on a raw food concentrates during processing,
meaning that the residue on the processed food is greater than the
residue on the raw, food, the residue on the processed food is
considered a food additive and is regulated under section 409.
Otherwise, pesticide residues on or in processed foods are regulated
under section 408. Section 408 contains a flow-through provision
allowing tolerances for residues on raw foods to flow through to
processed foods.' Thus, tolerances for raw foods and un-
concentrated residues in processed foods are set under section 408,
dealing specifically with pesticides, while tolerances for residues which
are known to concentrate in processed foods are set under section
409, dealing with food additives in general. The important distinction
between the two statutory sections is the presence of the Delaney
Clause in only section 409.
Section 408 allows tolerances for pesticides to be set based on a
risk-benefit analysis, 3 while section 409 adheres to the Delaney
Clause's zero-risk standard. EPA has maintained a strict interpreta-
tion of the Delaney Clause in section 409 and, consequently, if any
portion of a crop to which a carcinogenic pesticide has been applied
is processed in a way that will cause concentration of the pesticide
residue, EPA's policy has been to deny section 409 clearance for the
processed food as well as denying a section 408 tolerance for the raw'
food. 4  When required section 408 tolerances cannot be granted,
EPA is also required to deny registration of the pesticide under
FIFRA.Y This differential treatment of raw and processed foods has
become known as the "Delaney Paradox" and has caused the
10. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(c) (1994).
11. Vogt, supra note 2, at 2.
12. Benomyl, Trifluralin, Mancozeb, and Phosmet: Revocation of Certain Food Additive
Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,684, 33,685 (1994).
13. The FFDCA § 408 allows tolerances for pesticides in or on raw agricultural commodities
to be set with consideration given to "the necessity for the production of an adequate,
wholesome, and economical food supply... ." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1994).
14. See National Research Council,-Regulating Pesticides in food: the Delaney Paradox 2
(1987) [hereinafter "REGULATING PESTICIDES"].
15. Id.
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registration of many pesticides to hinge on whether, they concentrate
in food processing.
B. Criticism of the Delaney Clause
The Delaney Clause has been criticized repeatedly because it is
responsible for major pitfalls in new product development and creates
recurring problems with ,products already on the market. The
Delaney Clause also creates an unnecessary fear of some cancer risks,
dividing limited resources disproportionately between cancer risk
assessment and other types of risk assessment.
According to a 1987 National Research Council survey of
Research and Development directors of twenty major pesticide
manufacturers, new product development is significantly hindered by
the Delaney Clause. Respondents estimated that research and
development (R&D) costs for a new product eliciting an undisputed
carcinogenic response and having use patterns in processed foods
which require a section 409 clearance would be reduced by an average
of five to fifteen percent if the Delaney Clause did not apply and the
risk-benefit analysis of section 408 governed registration. 6 Almost
unanimously, respondents agreed that chances of actually receiving
section 409 clearance for such a product under the Delaney Clause
would be practically nonexistent, while under risk-benefit analysis
chances would be around fifty percent. 7 Additionally, respondents
felt that research and developmenf time could be reduced by one to
two years if the Delaney Clause were eliminated. 8
More imminent problems created by the Delaney Clause lie in
reregistration of older pesticides. FIFRA requires reregistration of
any pesticide registered before November 1, 1984.1' Reregistration
poses many potential problems for pesticide manufacturers because
EPA has instituted programs to greatly expand its toxicological data
onpesticides.' Older pesticides tested under new EPA standards
are far more likely to be identified as carcinogenic as well as more
16. Id. at 249. To clarify, the 5-15 percent reduction in R&D costs represents the costs of
performing the additional section 409 tests for carcinogenicity that would be required to seek
a tolerance under that section.
17. Id. at 250.
18. Id.
19. 7 U.S.C. § 136a-l(a) (1994).
20. See REGULATING PESTICmES, supra note 14, at 2.
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likely to be found to concentrate in processed foods.2' The combina-
tion of these factors would force EPA to ban many older pesticides
under the Delaney Clause regardless of other factors, such as lack of
replacement pesticides or the need of a pesticide to prevent epidemic
disease.
The problems created by the Delaney Clause reach beyond the
pesticide industry. The application of the Delaney Clause may limit
the introduction of newer, less toxic pesticides to replace older, more
dangerous ones.2" Other critics argue the Delaney Clause forces
research and development programs to divert funds disproportionately
to cancer studies. They argue that the Delaney Clause has singled out
one health endpoint, cancer, and has overlooked other more pressing
health issues such as neurotoxicity, developmental toxicity, endocrine
disruption, and immunological disorders.' Additionally, Bruce
Ames, a researcher at the University of California-Berkley, argues
that 99.99 percent of pesticides we ingest occur naturally in plants so
reducing our exposure to the other 0.01 percent that are synthetic will
have no effect on cancer rates.24 He proposes that modern risk
assessment methods are flawed in that linear extrapolation from near-
toxic doses in rodents to low-level exposures in humans has led to
grossly exaggerated cancer risks and an imbalance in society's
perception of hazard and the allocation of resources.' Further,
modern analytical techniques allow for the detection of pesticide
residues at levels up to one million times lower than possible 30 years
ago at the inception of the Delaney Clause.26 Ames concludes that
regulating trivial risks, as the Delaney Clause often requires, impedes
effective risk management and may divert resources from much more
important health risks that urgently need to be addressed.27
Criticisms .of the Delaney Clause led to a National Research
Council study on the regulation of pesticides. The 1987 study
concluded that progress toward uniform risk reduction would be
greatest and most uniform when raw and processed foods were
21. Id
22. See Vogt, supra note 2, at 3.
23. Id.
24. Bruce N. Ames, The Causes and Prevention of Cancer: The Role of the Environment,
CA51 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 49,60 (1995); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE
20 (1993).
25. Ames, supra note 24, at 62.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 63; see also BREYER, supra note 24, at 3-29.
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subjected to the same standard. The study suggested using a
negligible risk standard with no consideration of benefits. 8  The
study defined negligible risk to be the level at which cancer risks from
a pesticide residue do not exceed one in one million (1x10 6) over a
70-year lifetime.29 In the 1992 case Les v. Reilly, the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the need for change from the outdated Delaney Clause
standard, and called upon Congress to reform the statute.3° On
February 27, 1996, Michael W. Pariza, Director of the Food Research
Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, testified before the
Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the House Committee
on Commerce, stating that:
One of the most urgent matters bearing on competitive-
ness and innovation in the nation's food industry is
comprehensive Delaney reform. No doubt the Delaney
Clause seemed like a good idea in 1958, but we know
today that this legislation is seriously disconnected from
scientific reality... No other nation on earth has
burdened its regulatory authorities and food industries
with a policy like Delaney. This outmoded legislation
wastes resources, mis-directs public concern away from
important issues, has a stifling effect on innovation, and
impedes competitiveness. It is imperative that Delaney
be replaced with a flexible science-based policy...
Criticism of the Delaney Clause finally culminated in 1996 with the
signing of the FQPA.
28. REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 14, at 7. The study examined four possible
scenarios. The first was applying zero-risk to raw and processed foods; the second was applying
zero-risk to all pesticide residues in processed foods (this method assumed that if a residue was
detected in a processed food, tolerances for both the processed and raw foods would be
revoked); third was to revoke all tolerances when combined estimated cancer risk from the
residues of the pesticide on raw and processed foods exceeds 1 in 1 million over a 70-year
lifetime; and fourth was to revoke all tolerances when the total risk from residues of the
pesticide on all processed forms of a crop exceeds.1 in 1 million over a 70-year lifetime (this
method assumed that if a residue exceeded the prescribed tolerance in a processed food,
tolerances for both the processed and raw foods would be revoked). Id. at 6.
29. Id. at 39. This is the established level at which the FDA has determined the assessed
risk from cancer to be insignificant. Id
30. Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. The Need for FDA Reform of Food Regulation: Hearing on The Need for FDA Reform
Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env't of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1996).
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C. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
The FQPA is an extensive piece of legislation that deals with far
more than just Delaney Clause reform. However, Delaney Clause
reform is a prominent feature of the legislation. The FQPA addresses
the Delaney Clause specifically in regard to pesticide residues. The
law does not eliminate the Delaney Clause, as it still remains in effect
for food additives other than, pesticide residues. The FQPA is
intended to establish a more uniform regulatory scheme for pesticides
that is grounded in modem toxicological science and that balances
risks with the social and economic well-being of our nation.32
The FQPA amends several definitions to the FFDCA. The
FQPA redefines the exceptions to the definition of "food additive'! to
exempt "a pesticide chemical residue in or on a raw agricultural
commodity or processed food; or (2) a pesticide chemical . .. ""
"Pesticide chemical residue" is now clearly defined as "a residue in or
on a raw agricultural commodity or processed food of- (A) a
pesticide chemical; or (B) any other added substance that is present
on or in the commodity or food primarily as a result of the metabo-,
lism or degradation of a pesticide chemical."34 "'Processed food" is
defined as "any food other than a raw agricultural commodity and
includes any raw agricultural commodity that has been subject to
processing, such as canning, cooking, freezing, dehydration, or
milling."35 These changes alter the old FFDCA exceptions to food
additive status to allow pesticide residues on raw and processed foods
to be treated equally 6
Section 404 of the FQPA amends section 402 of the FFDCA to
state the following:
A food shall be deemed to be.adulterated - (2)(A) if it bears
or contains any added poisonous or added deleterious
32. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-669(I) at 37 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1208, 1212.
33. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 § 402(b), Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489,1513
(1996) (emphasis added).
34. § 402(a), 110 Stat. at 1513. Metabolic products of the pesticide are clearly addressed
in the new definition. This is signifiant because it reflects modem science's increased
understanding of toxicology and the effects of xenobiotic compounds. It allows EPA to regulate
substances that may not be toxic in their bioavailable form but do become toxic as a natural
consequence of the body's attempt to metabolize them.
35. § 402(c), 110 Stat. at 1513-14.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s)(1)-(2) (1994).
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substance (other than a substance that is a pesticide chemical
residue in or on a raw agricultural commodity or processed
food, a food additive, a color additive, or a new animal
drug) that is unsafe within the meaning of section 406; or
(B) if it bears or contains a pesticide chemical residue that
is unsafe within the meaning of section 408(a); or (C) if it is
or if it bears or contains (I) any food additive that is unsafe
within the meaning of section 409..."
The new definition clearly distinguishes between pesticide residues in
processed foods and food additives. Under the new scheme, pesticide
residues on or in processed foods will be regulated with pesticide
residues on raw foods under section 408, regardless of whether the
residues concentrate during processing, while substances remaining
within the FQPA's amended definition of food additives will be
subject to section 409 regulations and the Delaney Clause. EPA is
now allowed to set tolerances for all residues of registered pesticides
based on a risk-benefit analysis.38
In addition to making a clear and uniform distinction between
pesticide residues and food additives, the new statute grants EPA
significant flexibility in regulating pesticide residues and setting
tolerances. 9 The FQPA rewrites most of section 408 of the
FFDCA. The flow-through provision, removed from section 402, is
re-inserted into section 408(a)(2).4° Section 408(b) continues to
allow EPA to use a risk-benefit analysis when setting tolerances and
requires that certain criteria be factored into the analysis. 41 Section
408(b)(2)(B)(v) directs EPA to review tolerances every five years to
allow new scientific evidence to be assessed where it is applicable.42
Finally, the new section 408(b) specifically requires EPA to evaluate
37. § 404, 110 Stat. at 1514 (emphasis added). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
38. § 408(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv), 110 Stat. at 1516-17.
39. See § 405, 110 Stat. at 1513-35; H.R. RP'. No. 104-669(I), at 58-67 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1208, 1233-1242. The Administrator's new grant of power can be viewed
almost as a direct response to the court's strict interpretation of the Delaney Clause in Les v.
Reilly, 968 F.3d 985 (9" Cir. 1992). Congress is acknowledging the need for EPA to adjust to
new science without a time-consuming and often slow grant of legislative approval. See H.R.
REP. NO. 104-669(I), at 37 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1212.
40. 110 Stat. at 1514-15.
41. Id. at 1515-20.
42. Id. at 1517.
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data on the effects of pesticides on infants and children43 and to
evaluate whether certain substances may have effects on humans
similar to the effects produced by naturally occurring estrogen or
other hormones."
Section 408(b)(2)(A)(ii) defines "safe" for the purpose of setting
tolerances as "a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from
aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue, including all
anticipated dietary exposures and all other exposures for which there
is reliable information."'45 In making a determination of safety, the
FQPA allows EPA to consider such factors as the validity of scientific
data, anticipated and dctual residues of the pesticide in or on foods,
the percent of food actually treated with the pesticide,46 and interna-
tional standards.47 This new framework establishes a "reasonable
certainty of no harm" standard for determining safe levels of pesticide
residues in food.
Notably absent from the final version of the FQPA is an
additional subsection that would have prevented assessment of
economic effects on the registrant, manufacturer, or marketer of the
pesticide when setting tolerances.48 This makes it likely that such
factors will be considered by EPA in the future. The FQPA also adds
a consumer information clause49 and a provision which prevents
individual states from setting pesticide residue tolerance levels higher
43. § 408(b)(2)(C), 110 Stat. at 1517-18; H.R. REP. No. 669(I), at 60 (1996), reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1235. The inclusion of this provision is a direct result of a National
Research Council study examining the effects of pesticides on infants and children. The study
found quantitative differences in pesticide toxicity between children and adults due in part to
age-related differences in absorption, metabolism, detoxification, and excretion of xenobiotics.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN 3
(1993). Specifically in response to the study, section 408(b)(2)(C)(ii)(II) requires EPA to add
a factor of ten when calculating threshold effects of pesticide chemical residues for infants and
children. 110 Stat. at 1518.
44. § 408(p), 110 Stat. at 1532-33. EPA must develop a screening program for estrogen-
mimicking pesticide chemicals that will test all current and future use pesticides. Id.
45. § 408(b)(2)(A)(ii), 110 Stat. at 1516.
46. § 408(b)(2)(D)-(F), 110 Stat. at 1518-19.
47. § 408(b)(4), 110 Stat. at 1520. EPA must consider established International Codex
Alimentarius Commission maximum residue levels for the pesticide. If EPA decides to set a
different level, EPA must publish for public comments its reasons for the different level. Id.
'48. H.R. Rep. No. 104-669(I), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1235.
49. § 408(o), 100 Stat. at 1532. EPA must provide information that discusses risks and
benefits of pesticide use on foods, explains tolerances, and provides recommendations for ways
to reduce dietary exposure to pesticide residues for public display by large retail grocers. Id.
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than those established nationally.50 Finally, the FQPA mandates that
EPA must, within 10 years, review all pesticide tolerances in effect as
of the signing of the FQPA.5'
In sum, the FQPA makes significant changes to the FFDCA that
will allow EPA to treat pesticide residues on raw and processed foods
uniformly regardless of effects of processing on residue concentra-
tions. The revisions to section 408 provide EPA with more flexibility
for performing risk analysis, by allowing EPA to consider more risk
factors in setting tolerances. Simultaneously EPA is given more
power to consider the benefits of pesticide use. Section 409,
containing the Delaney Clause, is left intact, thus, maintaining a zero-
risk policy for carcinogenic food additives other than pesticide
residues.
D. The Case of Benomyl
The FQPA will have a significant impact on pesticide production
and use in general, and on future regulation of fungicides in particu-
lar. The estimated dietary carcinogenic risk associated with fungicides
represents approximately 85 percent of all dietary carcinogenic risk
from pesticides." As many of the fungicides in widespread use have
c6me up for reregistration, new scientific data has proven them to be
carcinogenic. The FQPA will allow a much more fair and uniform
assessment of these pesticides. The case of the fungicide benomyl
illustrates this Well.
Benomyl (methyl 1-[(butylamino) carbonyl]-H-benzimidazol-2-yl
carbamate) is a systemic, benzamidazole fungicide that is used against
a wide range of fungal diseases of field crops, fruits, nuts, ornament-
als, mushrooms, and.turfgrass.53 It has a relatively short half-life in
the environment - three to six months when applied to turf and six
to twelve months when applied to bare soil.54 In the human body,
it is rapidly broken down to carbendazim and then to other com-
pounds before being excreted. Benomyl and its metabolites have not
50. § 408(n), 110 Stat. at 1530-32. A state may petition EPA for authorization to set a level
higher than the national level and EPA may grant such authorizations at its. discretion.
§ 408(n)(5), 110 Stat. at 1531.
51. § 408(q), 110 Stat. at 1534-35.
52. See REGULATING PESTICiDES, supra note 14, at 97.
53. Benomyl, Extension Toxicology Network 1 (updated May 1994) <http'J/sulaco.oes.orst.-
edu:70/0/ext/extoxnetlpips/benomyl.p54> [hereinafter Benomyl].
54. Id. at 3.
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been found to bioaccumulate in human fat and muscle tissues over
long term exposure periods.'
Benomyl is classified by the World Health Organization as a class
III+ pesticide, the World Health Organization's safest classification for
pesticides, meaning the pesticide is unlikely to present hazard under
normal use. 6 The Reference Dose ("RfD") of benomyl is 0.05
mg/kg/day and the Acceptable Daily Intake ("ADI") is 0.02 mg/Kg/-
day.57" Benomyl is of such a low acute toxicity that it has been
impossible to establish an LD50 for mammals5 8 The LD50 for rats is
greater than 10,000 mg/Kg and for rabbits is greater than 3400
mg/Kg5
9
Benomyl has shown chronic toxicity in the form of severe liver
impairment in dogs fed doses of 150 mg/Kg/day in their diets for two
years.' The pesticide caused no reproductive effects in a three-
generation study of rats fed low doses (150 mg/Kg/day), while at
higher doses, viability and fertility of offspring was decreased.61
Teratogenicity (fetal toxicity) has been observed in rats and mice at
55. Ld.
56. Donald J. Ecobichon, Toxic Effects of Pesticides, in CASARETr & DOULL'S
TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 682 (Curtis D. Klaassen et al. eds., 5th ed.
1996).
57. Benomyl, supra note 53, at 4. The RfD is an estimate of the daily exposure to an agent
that is assumed to be without an adverse health impact on the human population. The ADI is
used by the World Health Organization for pesticides and food additives to define "the daily
intake of chemical, which during an entire lifetime appears to be without appreciable risk on the
basis of all known facts at that time." Elaine M. Faustman & Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk
Assessment, in CASARETr AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS, supra
note 57, at 80 (citing World Health Organization, Principles Governing Consumer Safety in
Relation to Pesticide Residues, WHO TECH. REP. SEP. 240 (1962)). Both are calculated as
follows:
(RfD) or (ADI) = NOAEIJUF*MF
where NOAEL = No Observed Adverse Effects Level as determined by animal bioassays; UF
= Uncertainty Factors and MF = Modifying factors used to account for variations caused by
extrapolations from test models. Elaine M. Faustman & Gilbert S. Omenn, Risk Assessment,
in CASARET AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS, supra note 56,
at 80-81.
58. Benomyl, supra note 53, at 1. The LD., is the median lethal dose, or the statistically
derived single dose of a substance expected to cause death in 50 percent of the animals tested.
David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen, Principles of Toxicology, in CASARETr & DOULL'S
TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS, supra note 56, at 21.
59. Benomyl, supra note 53, at 1.
60. Ild. at,2.
61. Id.
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doses of 62.5 mg/Kg and 100 mg/Kg respectively.62 However, no
teratogenicity has been observed in human studies. 3 Carcinogenic
effects on liver cells have been observed in mice in lifetime studies at
doses of about 40 to 400 mg/Kg/day with the metabolite carbendazim
being the likely ultimate carcinogen.' Because of conflicting data,
EPA has classified benomyl as only a possible human carcinogen. 65
Benomyl was first registered by DuPont in 1972 and by 1987 it
accounted for approximately 55 percent of the $320 million worldwide
benzamidazole fungicide market. A special review of benomyl was
initiated in the late 1970's, and, as a result of that review, its possible
carcinogenicity was discovered.66
EPA announced its findings regarding benomyl's cancer risk in
October 1988 and refused to revoke existing tolerances for use on
tomato products and raisins, both foods in which residues of benomyl
are known to concentrate during processing.67 EPA simultaneously
announced a new interpretation of the Delaney Clause permitting
concentrated carcinogenic pesticide residues in processed foods as
long as they posed only a de minimis risk of cancer, set at one in one
million (lx106 ) over a 70-year lifetime.6" In essence, EPA acknowl-
edged the obligation to revoke tolerances for tomato products and
raisins, but refused to do so. EPA's new interpretation was rejected
by the Ninth Circuit in Les v. Reilly. EPA was instructed to strictly
interpret the Delaney Clause and revoke the .tolerances at issue.69
As a result of the court's decision, EPA revoked tolerances in 199370
and issued a final rule for decision in 1994.71 Revocation of toleranc-
62. CATALOG OF TERATOGENIC AGENTS 244 (Thomas H. Shephard ed., 8th ed. 1995).
Typical teratogenic effects observed in rats and mice were hydrocephalus, cleft palates,
hydronephrosis, and skeletal defects. A human study of 900,000 people found no teratogenic
association between benomyl and eye defects. Id.
63. Id.
64. Benomyl, supra note 53, at 2.
65. Id.
66. REGULATING PESTICIDES, supra note 14, at 198.
67. 40 C.F.R. § 185.350 (1995). The tolerance level is set at 50 ppm (mgfKg) for both foods.
Id.
68. Regulation of Pesticides in Food: Addressing the Delaney Paradox Policy Statement,
53 Fed. Reg. 41,104, App. B (1988), reprinted in Les v. Reilly 968 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. See Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992).
70. Revocation of Food Additive Regulations for Benomyl, Mancozeb, Phosmet, and
Trifluralin, 58 Fed. Reg. 37,862 (1993).
71. Benomyl, Influralin, Mancozeb, and Phosmet; Revocation of Certain Food Additive
Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 33,684 (1994).
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es was never implemented and, following passage of the FQPA, the
final revocation actions were withdrawn by EPA in September 1996.7"
The FQPA will have a profound impact on benomyl. Benomyl
is now excepted from the definition of food additive, and thus
tolerances for tomato products and raisins will no longer fall under
the purview of section 409 of the FFDCA. Consequently, benomyl
residues are no longer subject to the Delaney Clause. Those
tolerances will now be set using the risk-benefit analysis of section
408. Under section 408, a "reasonable certainty of no harm" standard
will provide a more flexible framework for the setting of a safe
tolerance. Under this framework, EPA is likely to approve the use
of benomyl on tomatoes and raisins, as evidenced by their 1988
decision to list the pesticide as posing a de minimis risk of causing
cancer.
73
EPA possesses extensive data on benomyl and will be capable of
making an informed decision before approving a tolerance. Section
408 now gives EPA more flexibility in considering factors when
assessing benomyl's health risks. EPA will now evaluate the
developmental, endocrinal and carcinogenic effects of benomyl and its
metabolites using modem risk assessment techniques. In addition,
EPA may now also assess such factors as benomyl's widespread use
and the multimillion dollar costs farmers will face if forced to
substitute other pesticides.74
The approval of benomyl may or may not be a good decision.
On one hand, the compound has an extremely low acute toxicity, is
not persistent in the environment or the human body, and poses a
questionable, but likely inconsequential, risk of cancer. On the other
hand, benomyl's widespread use makes the compound highly
bioavailable for human consumption, and the compound has been
found to cause definite teratogenic effects in animal studies. The
FQPA mandates that some of these issues, such as teratogenicity, be
explored more fully in setting pesticide residue tolerance levels. The
FQPA will enable EPA to fully benomyl and its uses fully and will
lead to a decision on tolerances that is scientifically, economically, and
socially more sound than the outdated strict application of the
Delaney Clause.
72. Withdrawal of Pesticide Tolerance Revocations, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,684 (1996).
73. Regulation of Pesticides in Food, 53 Fed. Reg. at 41,105,41,120-23, reprinted in Les, 968
F.2d at 988.
74. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 37,865.
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The FQPA represents a turning point in the law. Tracing the
events that have led to passage of the FQPA demonstrates how the
law is recognizing the need for a flexible approach to risk regulation
that frees regulatory agencies to adapt and implement new scientific
discoveries and techniques as they become available. Institution of
this flexible approach places science at a crossroads as well. Science
is now faced with the responsibility of improving existing knowledge
and techniques to provide the regulatory process with effective tools
to carry out risk regulation.
II. SCIENCE AT THE CROSSROADS
The FQPA significantly expands the use of risk-benefit analysis
in risk regulation and relies on science to provide the knowledge and
tools necessary to quantify risks and build a foundation for effective
regulation. This signifies a fundamental shift in science. Science in
the past has sought to discover and understand. Now, science must
extend beyond discovery and understanding to synthesize information
and quantify risks. Science faces this crossroads in all aspects of risk
regulation. With the FQPA, Congress has acknowledged that science
is now capable of and responsible for providing risk estimations that
better serve society.'
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the scientific crossroads
is chemical carcinogenesis. During the time of Congressman Delaney,
cancer development was poorly understood. However, the past forty
years have seen remarkable advances in science's understanding of
cancer development. Chemical carcinogenesis research has uncovered
a type of environmental risk that is tremendously dynamic and
diverse. Researchers have discovered that chemical carcinogenesis is
a multi-stage disease that can occur through a number of different
pathways. Simultaneously, risk assessment is rapidly developing
methods to deal with these discoveries and produce more accurate
models of risk. Exploring the current body of scientific information
75. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-669, pt. 1, at 37 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1208,
1212. Perhaps, the best indicator of government acknowledgment of the dynamic nature of risk
regulation and the need to institute dynamic mechanisms to achieve effective regulation is the
publication for comment of EPA's Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment. The
Proposed Guidelines emphasize the need for "flexible problem-solving approaches that can link
ecological measurements and data with the decisionmaking needs of environmental managers."
Environmental Protection Agency's Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 61
Fed. Reg. 47,552, 47,555 (1996).
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about chemical carcinogenesis and cancer risk assessment illustrates
science's new position in our society.
A. Chemical carcinogenesis
Cancer is a broad term describing a subset of lesions of the
disease neoplasia, an abnormal autonomous growth of tissue.71 Such
tissues, referred to as neoplasms or, more commonly, tumors, may be
benign or malignant, the latter being differentiated by uncontrolled
secondary growth.77 Carcinogenesis is the transformation of normal
tissue to a neoplasm, and a carcinogen is an agent that causes or
induces this transformation!' Established carcinogens include many
environmental chemicals such as benzo[a]pyrene (a primary compo-
nent of cigarette smoke), benzene, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons,
and many pesticides.7
Alteration of DNA structure at the molecular level is the
underlying cause of carcinogenesis." Physically or chemically altered
DNA structures are termed adducts or lesions. Adduct formation is
a common occurrence in normal cellular functioning and does not
necessarily equate to cancer.8' Cellular systems have evolved several
mechanisms to protect against DNA adducts, such as direct DNA
repair and programmed apoptosis (cell death), both acting to prevent
replication and growth of mutated cells.s2
At least four major mechanisms of chemical carcinogenesis have
been identified. They include electrophilic interactions, oxidative
76. Henry C. Pitot III & Yvonne P. Dragan, Chemical Carcinogenesis, in CASARETr &
DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS, supra note 56, at 201.
77. Id.
,78. Id. at 202. Carcinogenesis includes the induction of neoplasms that are usually not
observed, thd earlier induction of neoplasms that are usually observed, and the increased
induction of neoplasms. Id. In essence, carcinogenesis is a term used to describe a series of
events resulting in a described outcome. The order and nature of the events can be greatly
varied and can occur spontaneously or as a result of either direct or indirect contact with a
stimuli.
79. Il at 245.
80. Id. at 214-26.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 225-35. Direct repair of DNA may occur via enzymatic reactions involving direct
reversal of DNA damage, base excision repair, nucleotide excision repair, postreplication repair,
and mismatch repair. The persistence of DNA adducts results from the failure of endogenous
repair systems and is directly correlated to incidences of neoplasia. The ability to endogenously
cope with DNA damage is strongly influenced by genetic factors and varies greatly from one
individual to the next. I. at 221-26.
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DNA damage, increased development of. background tumors, and
receptor protein interactions. 3 Each mechanism is complex and may
occur naturally or as a result of exposure to chemical agents. These
mechanisms may or may not lead to advanced stages'of cancer
development and may act independently or in conjunction with other
mechanisms.
Alteration of DNA at the molecular level may occur rapidly, but
the development of cancer as a disease is a slow process involving a
long latency period characterized by three stages between first
exposure to a chemical carcinogen and an ultimate malignant
neoplasm." The first stage is initiation, in which an irreversible
change occurs in the DNA of a single cell. 5 Initiation may occur
83. Electrophilic interactions form DNA adducts comprised of an electrophilic molecule
covalently bound to a nucleophilic moiety on a DNA strand. See David B. Clayson & Frank
Iverson, Cancer Risk Assessment at the Crossroads: The Need to Turn to a Biological Approach,
24 REGUL TOXICOL. PHARMACOL. 45, 48 (1996). Electrophilic interactions may occur
spontaneously as a result of natural processes or the introduction of exogenous chemical com-
pounds. id. Adducts formed by electrophilic interactions may undergo DNA repair, cause cell
death, or be replicated during cellular functioning; the latter process being a first step for
chemical carcinogenesis. Id.
Oxidative DNA damage occurs as a result of interactions between highly reactive oxygen
species and DNA. Id. at 48-49. Reactive oxygen species (ROS's) are a byproduct of leaky
energy conversion systems in many essential cellular functions. See Dennis V. Parke, The
Cytochromes P450 and Mechanisms of Chemical Carcinogenesis, 102 ENVIRON. HEALTH
PERSPECr. 852 (1994). The most reactive ROS is the hydroxyl radical produced by the Fenton
Reaction involving oxidation of a reduced transition metal in the presence of hydrogen peroxide.
See Irwin Fridovich, Superoxide Dismutases: An Adaptation to a Paramagnetic Gas, 264 J. BIOL.
CHEM. 7761 (1989). Hydroxyl radicals directly react with DNA resulting in damage to proximal
DNA structures. See Clayson & Iverson, supra, at 48-49. Oxidative DNA damage measured
in vivo in adult rats has been estimated at 1 million lesions per genome, however, mammalian
cells are highly evolved to deal with oxidative damage through specific DNA repair mechanisms
and most oxidative DNA damage does not lead to neoplastic initiation. Id.
The third mechanism of chemical carcinogenesis is the increased development of naturally
occurring background tumors. Id. at 49. Preneoplastic lesions arise naturally as a statistical
inevitability of DNA repair mechanisms. Id. A relatively new field of cancer research is
attempting to quantify increases in the development of these background lesions into actual
neoplasms. The exact mechanism causing increased development is still unknown, but is
suspected to be related to either electrophilic mechanisms or oxidative damage. Id.
A fourth mechanism for chemical carcinogenesis involves the interaction of specific
substances with receptor proteins to form complexes that alter the expression genetic
information. Id. at 49-50. Many of the substances identified as acting in this way have been
associated with cellular proliferation in endocrine or endocrine-responsive cells. Id. 2,3,7,8-
Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD), the suspected carcinogenic contaminant of Agent Orange
and the most potent rat chemical carcinogen known, is thought to act through this mechanism.
Id.
84. Pitot & Dragan, supra note 76, at 226.
85. Id. at 227.
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endogenously or as a result of an exogenous carcinogen acting directly
on DNA. Preneoplastic lesions occurring as a result of initiation are
common in many systems and do not lead to neoplasia in the absence
of the latter stages of development. 6 The second stage, promotion,
involves the proliferation of initiated cell populations." The final
stage, progression, signifies the conversion of non-intrusive, benign
neoplasms into malignant neoplasms."8 Progression is the most
recognizable event in cancer development and is characterized by
expression of genetic damage typically manifested by abnormal
metastatic growth, tissue invasiveness, hormonal responsiveness, and
morphological characteristics. 9 Initiation, promotion, and progres-
sion are highly interrelated and may occur as the result of contact by
a carcinogen capable of eliciting all three responses or through contact
with multiple carcinogens each capable of eliciting a separate
response.
The critical concept of cancer development is its dynamic nature:
each stage is interrelated and involves a statistical probability of
progression to the next stage. Understanding the dynamic nature, of
chemical carcinogenesis enables one to better understand the
monumental task faced by risk assessment as it attempts to quantify
the risks posed by pesticides. It also demonstrates why -the Delaney
Clause is outdated in relation to pesticides. Carcinogenesis is a
complex process involving many variables. When viewed in this way,
many chemicals are carcinogens; however, few are complete carcino-
gens capable of causing cancer development in the absence of other
aggravating factors. Approximately 50 percent of chemicals tested in
laboratory animals are found to have some carcinogenic activity, while
scientists within the National Toxicology Program estimate that as few
as 10-15 percent of these actually pose a realistic threat.9" Therefore,
bright-line rules such as the Delaney Clause are unrealistic and
inconsistent with modem science.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 227-30. Promotion differs from initiation in that it is a reversible process and does
not require direct interaction with DNA. Id. Typically, promotion occurs as a result of
expression of proto-oncogenes which enhance cellular proliferation of initiated cells, or through
repression of the expression of tumor suppresser genes which cause apoptosis of initiated cells.
Id. at 234-35.
88. Id. at 230.
89. Id.
90. John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal Government,
102 TOXICOLOGY 29, 38 (1995).
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B. Cancer Risk Assessment
The unrealistic nature of the Delaney Clause has forced a shift
in risk regulation that calls upon science to synthesize gathered data
to produce realistic quantifications of risk. Much like the FQPA's
approach to the crossroads in law, science is facing its crossroads by
moving away from bright-line techniques'to more realistic, flexible
methods. Science is bridging the gap between discovery and synthesis
With adaptable approaches to risk assessment that recognize past
changes in scientific knowledge and prepare for inevitable future
changes.
Risk assessment begins With the fundamental nature of the risk
being quantified. Quantifying risk is typically a task of handling
dynamic and evolving information. Examining the current and future
trends in risk assessment demonstrates that risk assessment is an
adapting science. Risk assessors recognize the flaws in their methods
and are constantly attempting to improve their science through new
and better techniques. Cancer risk assessment illustrates this well.
Current cancer risk assessment begins with the use of statistical
models developed from our understanding and lack of understanding
of cancer development. A theoretical safe dose of a carcinogen is
assumed to be nonexistent. Exposure to one carcinogenic molecule
may presumably lead to cellular initiation and eventually a malignant
neoplasm.9 The theoretical risk of this occurring for a carcinogen
of moderate potency has been calculated at about 1 in 1019.92 This
theory has led to the development of dose-response curves for tumor
incidence that are based on animal bioassays (usually chronic, 2-year
studies) carried out at a Maximum Tolerated Dose.93 The data from
animal bioassays is fit to a curve, the shape depending on the chosen
model, and the theoretical response to a given dose is then extrapolat-
ed from the curve. The one-hit hypothesis or linear model for cancer
risk assessment assumes that dose results in a linear response.94-
91. See Pitot & Dragan, supra note 76, at 255.
92. See Clayson & Iverson, supra note 84, at 50. To further illustrate, assuming a world
population of 5 billion and a mean generation time of 20 years, exposure of every individual to
one molecule of the carcinogen would lead to cancer once every 101 generations or 2 x 1012
years. Id.
93. See Samuel M. Cohen, Human Relevance of Animal Carcinogenicity Studies, 21 REGUL.
TOXICOL. PHARMACOL. 75 (1995) (assessing the strengths and weaknesses of animal bioassay
data).
94. See Pitot & Dragan, supra note 76, at 255. In a dose-response curve, dose is the
independent variable and is represented by the X-axis and response is the dependent variable
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Extensions of this model include the multi-hit model which factors in
the need for multiple events to occur for malignant cancer develop-
ment and the Linearized Multistage model ("LMS") (adopted by
EPA).9' LMS models incorporate theories of multiple stages of
cancer development into a statistical approach to risk quantification.
Prominent among these models is the Armitage and Doll approach
which is capable of incorporating one aspect of pathogenesis into a
model that assumes irreversibility of progression from one stage to the
next.96 Gaining more recent attention, the Moolgavkar two-stage
model factors *biological processes such as cell proliferation and
apoptosis into a two-stage linear model.97 Such linearized dose-
response models can then be used with exposure assessments to
develop statistical lifetime risk estimates. These estimates typically
employ a 95 percent upper confidence interval to the calculated risk
to decrease the likelihood of model failure.93
Despite these efforts, however, current cancer risk assessment
continues to be plagued by a lack of information. We still do not
fully understand the dynamics of cancer development, and conse-
quently, quantifying the risks associated with chemical carcinogens is
a monumental challenge. Current practices are hampered by
information gaps in dose-response curves, insufficient physiological
and biochemical information, incomplete knowledge of cancer
development, and inability to measure actual exposures.9 These
information gaps force risk assessment to utilize default assumptions
in an attempt to accurately portray risks."° The greater the use of
and is represented by the Y-axis. A linear response is a straight-line dose-response curve. In
linear multi-stage models, a straight-line curve is still present, but the slope of the line typically
changes from stage to stage. Id.
95. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT
65 (1994) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT].
96. See Pitot & Dragan, supra note 76, at 255.
97. Id. at 225; See also Suresh H. Moogavkar & t. George Luebeck, Incorporating Cell Pro-
liferation Kinetics into Models for Cancer Risk Assessment, 102 TOXICOLOGY 141,142-43 (1995).
98. See Pitot & Dragan, supra note 76, at 255; See also SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra
note 95, at 65.
99. See Graham, supra'note 90, at 41-45.
100. The current cancer risk assessment models rely heavily upon several inherent
assumptions. Among these assumptions are: (1) results at high doses in animal bioassays may
be linearly extrapolated to low dose exposures; (2) rodent bioassay results are relevant to
human populations; (3) there is no threshold dose for chemical carcinogens. See Pitot &
Dragan, supra note 76, at 254-57. Default assumptions are used for the uniformity, complete-
ness, and clarity they provide risk assessment. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 95, at 86-
87. But, when applied unilaterally they fail for a variety of reasons.
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default assumptions, the more risk assessment models become, like
the Delaney Clause, rigid methods too often arbitrary and unrealistic.
To deal with the inadequacies of current cancer risk assessment,
new, more flexible approaches are being created. Physiologically
based pharmacokinetic ("PBPK") models represent a scientific
advancement rapidly being developed to cope with such inadequacies.
The use of this method may greatly improve projection of risks by
The first assumption, that high-dose test results may be extrapolated to low-dose exposures,
fails for several reasons. Experimental results at high doses are relatively easy to quantify for
many carcinogens and test species. But, as doses decrease substantially and begin to drop to the
small doses actually encountered in the erivironment, experimental results quickly become
cloudy or completely lacking. See Cohen, supra note 93, at 79. For some carcinogens, DNA
mutations at the cellular level become the only means of quantifying results. As demonstrated
earlier, quantification at this level is doomed to inaccuracy because of endogenous DNA repair
systems and cellular apoptosis. See Clayson & Iverson, supra note 83, at 46; SCIENcE AND
JUDGMENT, supra note 95, at 86-87. Another problem arises in the case of nongenotoxic
carcinogens which typically act as promoter agents without acting directly upon DNA. A
primary example of model failure under these circumstances occurs with sodium saccharin, a
nongenotoxic carcinogen that experimental evidence has shown to be carcinogenic only in rats
treated at high doses. No experimental basis for low dose linear extrapolation has ever been
shown. See Cohen, supra note 93, at 77-79. Finally, linear extrapolations to low doses do not
typically account for changes in pharmacokinetics (relating exposure to dose) and pharmacody-
namics (relating dose to response) that occur in extrapolating high dose responses to low dose
exposures. See Graham, supra note 90, at 42.
The second assumption, that animal rodent bioassays are relevant to human populations fails
in some cases because physiological differences between humans and rodents lead to complete
breakdowns of experimental models. One well-known case involves chemicals found in wholly
volatilized unleaded gasoline which induce male rat-specific renal tumors through a male rat-
specific ac-globulin. See Clayson & Iverson, supra note 83, at 45; Graham, supra note 90, at 42.
Another key problem with animal bioassays is the use of MTD's in experimental designs.
MTD's tend to cause metabolic saturation of tissues and organs resulting in abnormal
metabolism and clearance of cellular constituents. This tends to lead to increased cellular
proliferation and genotoxicity. Both of these consequences have been implicated as major
factors in cancer development. See Clayson & Iverson, supra note 83, at 46-48; SCIENCE AND
JUDGMENT, supra note 95, at 65-67. A third problem with animal bioassays is illustrated by the
case of vinyl chloride showing an opposite failure of animal bioassays where the human cancer
risk of this chemical is thought to be substantially higher than that associated with laboratory
studies. SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT, supra note 95, at 65-66. The use of animal bioassays to
assess cancer risk is, at best, a qualitative tool that may be used to identify possible human
carcinogenicity.
The third major default assumption in current cancer risk assessment models, that no
thresholds exist for cancer development, is false, as demonstrated by naturally-occurring
background tumors that fail to develop into malignant neoplasms. Further support of threshold
doses is being supplied by research into DNA repair mechanisms. The body produces DNA
damaging agents endogenously as part of cellular functioning and, in response, has evolved
mechanisms specially equipped to cope with this damage. Experiments suggest that DNA repair
capacity is inducible and, therefore, capable of responding to increases in DNA damage or ROS
production. See Clayson & Iverson, supra note 83, at 48-49; Cohen, supra note 93, at 852-53.
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integrating highly complex systems into models that can assess an
abundance of factors and variables.
PBPK models are based on biological rate constants, partition
coefficients, and physiological parameters of exposed and test animals
as well as the pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics of the test
compound. This information is used to develop chemical concentra-
tion and time-course predictions for specific tissues and organs.01
PBPK models are capable of integrating biological, chemical, and
physiological data to produce models that can be effectively extrapo-
lated to human exposures at actual doses. Such models are capable
of processing large amounts of mathematical and biological data to
produce more accurate dose-response curves at high and low
doses." z  PBPK models have even been created using magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI) to generate three-dimensional physiological
images that can be incorporated into risk assessment models."°3
PBPK models allow for interspecies extrapolations by substituting
default assumptions with more appropriate parameter values for the
species of interest. Once a model is developed, computerized
simulation of possible exposure scenarios can be quickly performed
to estimate corresponding risks.4  PBPK models minimize the need
for dependence upon default assumptions in models, thus reducing the
uncertainty associated with the models and resultant risk assess-
ment."0 5 In addition, these models allow the development of well-
defined, experimentally-based dose-response curves that are far more
accurate than current dose-response curves."6 The problems
associated with PBPK models stem from the need for intricate
knowledge of a chemical's biochemistry and metabolism and of an
organism's physiology. 7 Additionally, identifying all of the param-
eters needed to accurately depict a real-world scenario is a time-
consuming and costly task." Undoubtedly, as our body of scientific
101. See John Nichols et al., Three-Dimensional Visualization of Physiologically Based Kinetic
Model Outputs, 102 ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECr. 952 (1994); Melvin E. Andersen & Kannan
Krishnan, Physiologically Based PharmacokInetics and Cancer Risk Assessment, 102 (Supp. 1)
ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECr. 103 (1994).
102. Andersen & Krishnan, supra note 101, at 103-04.
103. See Nichols et al., supra note 101, at 952-55.
104. See Andersen & Krishnan, supra note 101, at 103-04.
105. See id. at 104.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 107.
[Vol. 7:393
SCIENCE AND LAW AT A CROSSROADS
knowledge continues to grow at a rapid pace, these problems will
gradually be overcome.
Finally, chemical carcinogenesis and cancer risk assessment are
illustrative of many other difficulties that regulatory toxicology faces
as it reaches the crossroads in science. The FQPA mandates
developmental risk assessments to measure risks to infants and
children, an area as complex and rapidly-evolving as chemical
carcinogenesis.0 9 Such an area will undoubtedly see the same influx
of information and creation of more sophisticated risk assessment
models as discussed for chemical carcinogenesis. Already, embryolog-
ically-based dose-response models similar to PBPK models are being
developed. These models specifically address the physiological and
toxicological effects of contaminants on fetuses and infants." °
In sum, regulating toxicological risks tends to be complex and
highly interrelated, and risk assessment models are rapidly evolving
to more effectively deal with these problems. Enactment of the
FQPA changes the law's approach to the regulation of pesticides.
The decision has been made to replace the Delaney Clause's bright-
line rule regarding carcinogenic risk with a more flexible science and
economics based risk-benefit analysis. Simultaneously, we are also at
a turning point in science.- Laws such as the FQPA force science to
bridge the discovery and understanding phase of research with a data
synthesis phase to produce quantifiable risk estimates. Current risk
assessment models have failed to accurately portray risks associated
with environmental exposure to carcinogens, resulting in the undue
regulation of some compounds and inadequate regulation of other
compounds. Consequently, risk estimates have shown as much as a
10,800-fold exaggeration of risk, eroding public confidence in risk
assessment."' PBPK and similar models present the possibility of
incorporating the dynamic nature of disease development into
109. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 § 408(b)(2)(C), Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat.
1489, 1517-18 (1996). A recently published study indicates infants consume 3-4 times more food
on a body weight basis than adults and, additionally, their food sources tend to be far less
diverse. The result is an increased susceptibility to some environmental factors that is not
correctly accounted for in many risk assessments. B. Schilter et al., Limits for Pesticide Residues
in Infant Foods: A Safety-Based Proposal, 24 REGUL. ToxiCOL. PHARMACOL 126,126-27 (1996)
(supporting the use of a ten-fold safety factor where toxicological data is limited, especially
regarding neurotoxic effects).
110. See Robert J. Kavlock & R. Woodrow Setzer, The Road to Embryologically Based
Dose-Response Models, 104 (Supp. 1) ENVIRON. HEALTH PERSPECr. 107 (1996) (providing an
excellent review of risk assessment in the context of developmental endpoints).
111. Clayson & Iverson, supra note 84, at 46.
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mathematical models better equipped to quantify risks. The end
product is risk assessment that is adaptable to changing science and
capable of adequately portraying danger in a manner that wVll allow
our society to economically allocate resources to deal with 'real' risks
instead of 'possible' risks. The final question becomes: How should
the regulatory process operate at the crossroads in science and law?
III. CHALLENGES FOR THE REGULATORY STATE.
The challenges confronting the regulatory process in the face of
the changes in science and law are monumental. The FQPA will
cause significant changes in the functioning of EPA and its responsi-
bilities as a regulatory agency. EPA already faces tremendous
challenges in other regulatory arenas and the FQPA will only add to
these. As a result, recognizing the crossroads in science and law and
ensuring that the regulatory process can cope with these inherent
changes is imperative for EPA to succeed in the future.
The ultimate success of EPA and the regulatory process hinges
on the ability to handle evolving science and law. Success at the
regulatory level requires effective regulatory analysis and improved
risk communication. Effective regulatory analysis depends on the
adaptability, efficiency, and ability of regulators to handle changing
science and produce quality regulations well-grounded in sound
science, economics, and law. Improved risk communication depends
on the establishment of a leader for the regulatory process Who will
be trusted and can serve as an icon of risk analysis, guiding public
perceptions toward creation of a safer society.
A. Effective analysis
Effective regulatory analysis hinges on the abilities of the corps
of regulators performing the analysis. In the case of pesticide
residues, and in regulatory toxicology in general, the regulatory
process must be highly adaptable and staffed by multi-disciplinary
regulators who can perform efficient analyses.
The need for a highly adaptive regulatory process is grounded in
the fundamental nature of the risk being regulated. Toxicology and
risk assessment are sciences, and regulatory toxicology cannot escape
that science. Economic. analyses and risk-benefit decisions are only
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as good as the science upon which they are based."2 Therefore, the
need for a highly adaptive regulatory body is grounded in science.
Science is evolving and, therefore, undergoes constant change. The
logical conclusion for regulatory toxicology is that it must be equally
adaptive and dynamic in order to process and effectively analyze risks
originating in a changing scientific world.
Greater regulatory adaptability may lie in the more flexible
statutory language of the FQPA. The Delaney Clause contained rigid
language that left the regulatory process little room to maneuver.
Consequently, the regulatory process has been unable to effectively
adapt to changes in toxicology and risk assessment. The National
Research Council called for Delaney Clause reform in 1987.113 The
FQPA finally delivered some semblance of that reform in 1996."1
Nine years of misallocated resources filled the interim. In addition,
the National Research Council in 1993 recognized the special dangers
of pesticides in the diets of infants and children, yet it took three
years for the FQPA to be passed allowing the regulatory process to
finally act upon this new knowledge."5 More flexible statutory
language should produce a more adaptive and dynamic regulatory
process that is able to implement sound scientific evidence more easily
and prevent years of misallocated resources and unregulated risks.
Second, regulatory analysis must be performed by well-qualified,
multi-disciplinary individuals. Skill in economic, policy, and scientific
analysis is critical for effective analysis in regulatory toxicology.
Foremost among these skills is the need for well-qualified scien-
tists. 116 Science is the foundation of regulatory toxicology; all other
analyses build on this foundation. Sound science must be at the heart
of any reform of regulatory toxicology."7 Regulatory toxicology,
112. Gio Batti God reminds us of the need for valid scientific truth in policy-making and
states that "generalizations based on reductionist models are not value-neutral but a matter of
opinion and therefore the instrument of special interest. When presented as established fact,
they become an obvious menace to freedom and fairness, in both public and private policies."
Gio Batta God, The Role of Objective Science in Policy Development Evidence versus Conjec-
ture, 24 REGUL. TOXICOL. PHARMACOL S3, S5-S6 (1996).
113. See discussion supra pp. 403-06.
114. See discussion supra pp. 406-09.
115. See supra note 43.
116. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS
IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 24 (Paul C. Stem & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) [hereinafter
"UNDERSTANDING RISK"].
117. See id.; see also John Cady, FDA Reform: The Need for a Sound Science-Based
Approach, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 407,407-08 (1996). Cady specifically deals with FDA reform
and argues for change that will encourage creativity and flexibility that allows adaptation to
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however, is not a purely scienific endeavor. Economic and policy
training are equally important."' Building on a strong foundation
of scientific research will make economic analyses more reliable and
will result in a better regulatory process. 9  Multidisciplinary
regulators capable of discerning good economic cost-benefit analyses
built on strong science could take a more holistic approach to the
regulatory process and produce more effective regulation. 20
Finally, regulatory analysis must be efficient. Richard Pildes and
Cass Sunstein report that our nation spends as much as $400 billion
dollars per year on regulation.' A substantial portion of this is
spent on regulatory toxicology. The current system is criticized for
being ineffective at allocating resources and appropriately setting
priorities for research and regulation. This has resulted in an
inconsistent regulatory processY2 Part of the problem is a regulato-
ry process (EPA included) that is far too bureaucratic and chaotic
with little integration among agencies or even regulations."z
Regulators taking a more holistic approach to the regulatory process
could eliminate many of the communication breakdowns and tie-ups
that often occur within a large bureaucracy. Such regulators could
have more control over scientific methods and allocation of resources
changing science. He denounces the FDA's need to establish advisory panels to make decisions
on new food additives and argues instead for more efficient alternatives for making scientific
decisions such as third-party review. Id. at 408. Cady's argument can easily be applied to EPA's
responsibilities to oversee pesticide residue regulation.
118. Science is indispensable to risk analysis, but is not the lone component of good risk
decisionmaking. Public choices, economic impacts, and legal implications must all be considered
as parts of the risk problem. See UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 116, at 24-26.
119. Cass Sunstein acknowledges that "[w]ithout accurate data, any exercise in quantification
can be illusory, giving the impression of far more knowledge than people actually have." Cass
R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247,
264 (1996) (footnote omitted).
120. Holistic Risk Assessment (HRA) is an emerging theory in environmental decision-
making and is defined as "the process of integration of several nonsequential steps that tabulate
and express risk factors and choices for both human and ecological systems through comparative
integration." Terence Harvey et al., Holistic Risk Assessment: An Emerging Process for
Environmental Decisions, 22 REGUL. TOXICOL PHARMACOL. 110, 111 (1995). HRA ties
together human health and ecological risk characterizations and includes steps from chemical
or hazard identification all of the way through risk communication. See id. Use of this process
cin help to facilitate efficient and more appropriate allocation of resources. See id. at 114.
121. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CH. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1995).
122. See BREYER, supra note 24, at 10-29; Sunstein, supra note 119, at 257-60.
123. See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 121, at 3-4 (stating that national bureaucracies are too
numerous and regulations are too independent resulting in inconsistency within the regulatory
process).
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and would be better equipped to eliminate wasteful and unproductive
regulation that consumes valuable time and resources. 24 The result
would be a more efficient and cost-effective regulatory process.
B. Improved Risk Communication
The crossroads faced by science and law contain many gray areas
and difficult choices. The nature of some of these choices cannot be
easily communicated to the public because of expert disagreements
and a lack of reliable scientific results. However, many of the choices,
such as Delaney Clause Reform, have had overwhelming expert and
industry support for years. As such situations arise, expert and
industry consensus must be successfully communicated to the public
at large.
EPA has recognized that successful risk communication is an
integral part of the process of assessing and analyzing risk." The
National Research Council concluded that "it is mistaken to expect
improved risk communication to always reduce conflict and smooth
risk management. ... But even though good risk communication
cannot always be expected to improve a situation, poor risk communi-
cation will nearly always make it worse."'126
Currently, public perceptions of risk and expert perceptions of
risk are divergent. Risks associated with pesticides illustrate this well.
A 1987 survey of women, college students, activists, and experts
ranking the perceived risk for thirty activities and technologies
showed concern over pesticides ranking as high as fourth and as low
as fifteenth with experts ranking them as eighth.27 This demon-
strates the varying degrees of concern that different segments of our
124. Such regulators could facilitate effective identification of how research resources need
to be allocated. Government must place a high premium on accurate information and regulators
fueled by this intent must seek the best data they can find. Sunstein, supra note 119, at 264.
At times the private sector can best fulfill this need where competition for government research
resources may act as an incentive to produce accurate and reliable scientific data. See id.
(acknowledging the need to gather information from the private as well as public sectors and
criticizing the current regulatory process for failing to create incentives to produce accurate
data.); Cady, supra note 117, at 408 (stating "[s]cientific expertise does not reside only within
the agency [FDA] .... Reform measures must look outside of the agency to accelerate the
pace of review.")
125. See Proposed Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 47552, 47,556
(1996).
126. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 3 (1989)
[hereinafter "IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION"].
127. BREYER, supra note 24, at 34.
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society" have regarding pesticide risks. Mustering support for risk
management is difficult when perceived risk varies greatly among
affected parties.
Such fragmented goals are highly detrimental to the regulatory
process. Legislative acts such as the FQPA depend on public and
expert support for successful implementation at the regulatory level.
A regulatory process torn between regulating the public's perceived
risk and accomplishing the often distinctly different goal of producing
a safer society is ineffective. A regulatory process with limited
resources cannot accomplish such divergent goals and must use risk
communication to produce more synchronistic goals. Such syn-
chronicity could be partially accomplished by the establishment of a
leader for the regulatory process who can help build public trust and
can serve as an icon of risk analysis and guide public perceptions.
This risk communicator could help re-establish confidence in the
regulatory process and unify public and expert risk perceptions.
A risk communicator faces a difficult task in unifying expert and
public risk perceptions.. Justice Breyer leaves little hope for such an
endeavor:
It is hard to make the normal human mind grapple with this
inhuman type of problem. To change public reaction, one
would either have to institute widespread public education
in risk analysis or generate greater public trust in some
particular group of experts or the institutions that employ
them. The first alternative seems unlikely. The second, over
the past thirty years, has not occurred.1
While Justice Breyer's statement about generating greater public trust
correctly identifies the solution, establishing such trust remains
problematic.
Justice Breyer's solution is worth exploring in the context of
EPA. Trust is a critical factor in risk communication. 29 Problems
with our current regulatory efforts point to a lack of trust in govern-
128. Id. at 39.
129. See L.J. Frewer et al., What Determines Trust in Information About Food-Related Risks?
Underlying Psychological Constructs, 16 RISK ANALYSIS 473, 473 (1996) (stating that trust in
information about food-related risks may be viewed as being as important as the content of the'
information.); Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 675
(1993).
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ment regulation as being a major causal element.130 If we do not
trust government agencies and administrators, whom do we trust?
Recent research shows that we place a high degree of trust in
physicians and little trust in government and industry officials. 3'
This conclusion is probably not shocking to most readers. Currently,
it is hard for the public to identify with EPA. It is a large bureaucrat-
ic organization headed by an Administrator. There is little with which
those outside of government can identify. One way to correct this
would be to establish an EPA Surgeon General recruited from the
medical and toxicology fields. We all deal with doctors. We know
them and interact with them. And, for the most part, we trust
them. An EPA Surgeon General could be symbolic of the work
being conducted at the agency. He or she would be viewed as a
leader and could assume the position of a primary risk communicator.
Establishing such a position could have several advantages. First,
since an EPA Surgeon General would be an individual with special-
ized medical training, he or she would be competent to discuss the
human health aspects of the risk they are dealing with. Such skills
add greatly to the credibility of a risk communicator. 33 Second, as
a medical professional, he or she would be more trusted than
someone from a non-medical field. Third, since the EPA Surgeon
General would have a primary goal of public communication, he or.
she would be visible and identifiable to the public. Fourth, an EPA
Surgeon General would be a unifying voice of EPA, helping eliminate
conflicting risk communication. Finally, he or she would be the
'keystone in building confidence and support for risk communication
at the upper levels of government management. The outcome would
be greater acceptance of and emphasis on risk communication at all
levels of government. An EPA Surgeon General would be capable
of establishing the public support needed to modify legal relics such
130. Slovic, supra note 129, at 676.
131. See Frewer et al., supra note 129, at 481-84 (presenting the results of two surveys in
England which both ranked medical doctors as the most trustworthy sources of risk information
and ranked government ministers and members of parliament as the least trustworthy sources
of risk information); Slovic, supra note 129, at 676 (contrasting our relatively high degree of trust
in physicians administering potentially risky X-rays and medicines with our relatively low degree
of trust in government officials overseeing management of nuclear power and nonmedical
chemicals).
132. See Frewer, supra note 129, at 481-84; Slovic, supra note 129, at 676.
133. See IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 126, at 124-25.
Spring 1997]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
as the Delaney Clause, thus adding to the adaptability and efficiency
of the regulatory process.
Certainly, fulfilling the requirements of the position outlined
above would be a monumental task. Trust is a fragile commodity that
is difficult to build and easy to destroy."4 This only makes the task
of an EPA Surgeon General more difficult, but few tasks within
regulatory toxicology are easy. This is the price we pay for a
technologically advanced society. Hopefully, in time, an EPA
Surgeon General could re-establish our society's trust in regulatory
toxicology and unify the dual objectives of regulating publicly-
perceived risks and accomplishing actual public safety.
CONCLUSION
The FQPA represents a crossroads in both science and law. A
fundamental shift in how the law approaches risk regulation is
occurring. The FQPA replaces the rigid statutory language used by
the Delaney Clause to regulate pesticide residues in processed foods
with a more flexible science-based approach. The more flexible
approach will give EPA more freedom and responsibility to act in the
face of scientific ' change. Simultaneously, the FQPA requires science
to extend its traditional goals of discovery and understanding to the
more synthetic goals of accurately evaluating information and
quantifying risks. The end result of the FQPA is an EPA and a
regulatory process poised on the verge of tremendous change.
The extension of scientific responsibilities will give EPA the
chance to develop and institute more accurate risk assessment models
to more precisely define risks. The discovery of multiple stages and
pathways in chemical carcinogenesis has greatly changed the way we
view cancer and cancer risk. This new knowledge of cancer's dynamic
nature has led to the development of physiologically-based risk
assessment models capable of dealing with such dynamic concepts.
EPA must recognize such innovative technologies and allocate
sufficient resources to continue developing new, more accurate risk
assessment models.
If we ignore the momentous changes occurring in science and
law, the consequences may be serious. Failure of EPA to act
decisively and efficiently under the freedom of flexible laws such as
134. See Slovic, supra note 129, at 676-78 (discussing the nature of trust in relation to human
psychology).
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the FQPA will force a reversion to rigid statutory language that
specifically dictates EPA's course of action. Concurrently, failure of
EPA to develop and adopt more effective risk assessment models that
make use of state of the art understandings of risk etiology will result
in inaccurate and dangerously misleading risk estimations.
EPA must acknowledge its position at the crossroads. At the
regulatory level, EPA must adopt adaptable methods, multi-disciplin-
ary approaches, and efficient analyses that will guarantee effective
functioning. EPA must also improve its risk communication with the
public to ensure awareness of EPA's position and rebuild trust and
credibility in the agency. The end result will be a credible, more
unified EPA seeking goals that the public understands and supports.
By ignoring the role it plays in changing science and law, EPA
will continue to fall prey to criticisms of ineffectiveness and incompe-
tence. The regulatory process will become increasingly difficult and
riddled with faults. Resources will continue to be misallocated and
society's demand for a safer enironment will not be adequately met.
EPA will become a straw house battered by the increasingly strong
winds of change that are inevitable in our modem world.
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